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DENIAL OF ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR CLAIMS OF SEXUAL
HARASSMENT RESOLVED THROUGH INFORMAL
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A SHIELD FOR
EMPLOYERS, A SWORD
AGAINST WOMEN1
AMY HOLZMAN
INTRODUCTION
Working nine to five
What a way a to make a living
Barely getting by
It's all taking and no giving
They just use your mind
And they never give you credit
It's enough to drive you crazy if you let it
Nine to five
For service and devotion
You would think that I
Would deserve a fair promotion
Want to move ahead
But the boss won't seem to let me
I swear sometimes that man is out to get me2
The problems particular to working women have been popularized
in the mass media,3 written about by legal scholars,4 acted upon by
1. This Note focuses on paradigmatic sexual harassment cases involving the
harassment of women by men. See Ellen Bravo & Ellen Cassedy, The 9to5 Guide to
Combating Sexual Harassment: Candid Advice from 9to5, the National Association
of Working Women 64 (1992) (noting that research reveals that an estimated 90% of
workplace sexual harassment cases arise from men harassing women; 9% is same-sex
harassment; and 1% is women harassing men); Barbara Gutek, Understanding Sexual
Harassment at Work, 6 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 335, 343-45 (1992)
(concluding that "[o]n the basis of the set of studies done so far, it seems likely that
overall, from one-third to one-half of all women have been sexually harassed at some
time in their working lives, although frequency rates in some types of work may be
higher").
To reflect this reality of women as those subject to sexual harassment, the pronoun
"she" is used throughout this Note to refer to the harassed individual.
2. Dolly Parton, 9 to 5, on 9 to 5 and Odd Jobs (RCA Records 1980).
3. See, e.g., Anita Hills' Charge of Sexual Harassment Against Clarence Thomas,
1991: Hearings on the Confirmation of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court of the
United States before the Senate Judiciary, 102 Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (televised hear-
ings on sexual harassment that received extensive media attention); Dolly Parton,
supra note 2 (sound track to the motion picture 9 to 5); 9 to 5 (Disney 1980) (motion
picture in which three female employees fight sexual harassment by holding their
harassing boss hostage, and instituting policies to ameliorate the conditions of the
workplace for women, such as flexible work hours and a day-care center).
4. See Lin Farley, Sexual Shakedown: The Sexual Harassment of Women on the
Job (1978); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women (1979);
Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: Tire Ideology of Reasona-
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Congress through the establishment of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,1 and construed by the federal courts to recognize a cause
of action for sexual harassment.' In the movies, female employees
can combat sexual harassment by holding their male boss hostage
while instituting work conditions favorable to women.7 In reality, wo-
men have too few alternatives. Specifically, women may try to rem-
edy the harassment on their own or seek redress under Title VII
through administrative proceedings followed by judicial proceedings,
Often the most favorable option is a combination of both: resolving
the problem within the company, while retaining a right to sue if set-
tlement is not reached. Informal dispute resolution provides the fo-
rum for this goal.
To enforce the statutory right to be free from employment discrimi-
nation, Title VII implements various dispute resolution mechanisms.9
In addition, Congress, by incorporating an attorney fee-shifting provi-
sion, section 706(k), into Title VII,10 created an exception to the
American rule that parties to a lawsuit pay their own attorney's fees.1
Section 706(k) enables an aggrieved employee to recover attorney's
fees if her claim is successful. 1
2
The statutory scheme of Title VII requires an aggrieved employee
to file with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 3 If the
EEOC determines that the charge is based upon reasonable cause, it
bleness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 Yale L.J. 1177 (1990); Susan Estrich, Sex at
Work, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 813 (1991); Deborah L. Rhode, The 'No-Problem' Problem:
Feminist Challenges and Cultural Change, 100 Yale L.J. 1731 (1990).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Title VII provides: "It
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
Title VII covers private employers with 15 or more employees, as well as unions
with 15 or more members, educational institutions, state and local governments, and
parts of the federal government. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(a),(b),(e), and 16(a).
6. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (holding that Title VII
prohibits sexual harassment).
7. 9 to 5 (Disney 1980).
8. The statutory scheme of Title VII requires an aggrieved employee to exhaust
her administrative remedies before she can institute a lawsuit in federal court. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(f)(1); see infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
9. See Marjorie A. Silver, The Uses and Abuses of Informal Procedures in Federal
Civil Rights Enforcement, 55 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 482, 508-19 (1987) (discussing alter-
natives ranging from litigation to mediation).
10. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988 & Supp. IV
1992)).
11. Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front in the Fight for Civil Rights: The Supreme
Court, Congress, and Statutory Fees, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 291, 297 (1990) (citing Fleisch-
mann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717-18 (1967)).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) provides: "In any action or proceeding under this sub-
chapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... reasonable
attorney's fee[s] .... "
13. See infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
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will take informal steps to reach conciliation between the aggrieved
employee and her employer. 14 This conciliatory stage usually triggers
the company's internal grievance procedures.15
Title VII does not require the complainant to hire an attorney to
file the charge, but often the services of an attorney are important.' 6
Section 706(k) gives the court the discretion to award reasonable at-
torney's fees to the prevailing party "[i]n any action or proceeding
under this subchapter.' 7 The statute is unclear what types of pro-
ceedings qualify for a prevailing party to recover attorney's fees. Con-
sequently, lower courts disagree regarding whether attorney fee-
shifting applies to informal proceedings. The trend, however, is to
deny such fees.
This Note explores the importance of both informal dispute resolu-
tion and the subsequent recovery of attorney's fees under Title VII in
sexual harassment cases. Part I tracks the divergent interests of wo-
men and employers in informal dispute resolution in resolving claims
of sexual harassment. This part argues that the potential for conflict-
ing concerns of women and employers points to the necessity of pro-
viding women with an economically viable means of vindicating their
right to be free from sexual harassment, specifically through attorney
fee-shifting pursuant to Title VII. Part II reviews the statutory
scheme of Title VII, focusing on attorney fee-shifting and the role of
informal dispute resolution. Part III examines the statutory policies
behind section 706(k) and the judicial interpretation of these policies,
analyzes the rationales underlying the denial of awarding attorney's
fees for these proceedings, and highlights the deficiencies of this posi-
tion. Part IV proposes amending Title VII explicitly to provide for
attorney's fees for informal dispute resolution and sets up guidelines
for such awards. This Note concludes that attorney fee-shifting for
informal dispute resolution is necessary to provide complete relief for
victims of employment discrimination, as Congress envisioned
through the enactment of section 706(k) of Title VII.
I. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE
The divergent interests of employers and women in resolving claims
of sexual harassment through informal dispute resolution leads to the
conclusion that women, like their employers, should have the option
to be represented by counsel.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(5)(b).
15. The informal conciliatory process utilizes the company's informal dispute reso-
lution procedures, unless the company refuses to participate, which leaves it open to
even greater liability if the aggrieved employee wins in court. See discussion infra
part I.A.
16. See infra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
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A. Employers' Interests in Informal Dispute Resolution
Employers have a great interest in resolving complaints of sexual
harassment through informal dispute resolution, namely internal
grievance procedures. Employers lose money if they fail to remedy
sexual harassment.'" In addition, concerns about employee morale
and employers' reputations also weigh in favor of early resolution of
sexual harassment claims.' 9 Most importantly, internal grievance pro-
cedures may not only result in a quick resolution of the dispute, but
also shield companies from liability.
Effective internal grievance procedures can help employers lessen
or avoid liability even in the most egregious sexual harassment scena-
rios.20 Courts determine an employer's liability based on agency prin-
ciples.2' For example, in quid pro quo cases,22 courts hold employers
18. A 1988 survey of 160 manufacturing and service companies revealed that the
typical Fortune 500 company (having about 23,750 employees) loses $6.7 million a
year, not including the cost of lawsuits, because of sexual harassment. See Bravo &
Cassedy, supra note 1, at 49 (citing a Working Woman magazine study). These losses
are comprised of absenteeism, lower productivity, and employee replacement (rehir-
ing and retraining). Id.
19. Id. at 50.
20. See, e.g., Dornhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix Corp., 828 F.2d 307, 309-10 (5th
Cir. 1987) (finding no employer liability when employer told the harassed individual
to finish the last day of a three-day trip and she would no longer have to work with
the co-worker, who touched her breasts and other body parts, and "playfully choked"
her during the first two days of the trip); Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc.,
845 F.2d 900, 904 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding no employer liability when employer
threatened to fire both the harasser and the harassed, who was regularly bullied,
called a "bitch" and a "whore," and receive verbal threats that she would be
undressed).
21. Agency principles guide courts in determining employer liability in sexual har-
assment cases. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). The EEOC
guidelines indicate that discriminatory acts by agents or supervisors are attributable to
an employer, regardless of the employer's knowledge or authorization of the unlawful
conduct. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1990) provides:
Applying general Title VII principles, an employer... is responsible for its
acts and those of its agents and supervisory employees with respect to sexual
harassment regardless of whether the specific acts complained of were au-
thorized or even forbidden by the employer and regardless of whether the
employer knew or should have known of their occurrence. The Commission
will examine the circumstances of the particular employment relationship
and the job functions performed by the individual in determining whether an
individual acts in either a supervisory or agency capacity.
Id. The Supreme Court in Meritor declined "to issue a definitive rule on employer
liability," but did agree with the EEOC that employer liability rests on agency princi-
ples. 477 U.S. at 72.
22. Quid pro quo cases involve an employer offering a tangible job benefit or det-
riment based on the victim's sexual submission or rejection, respectively. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(a)(1) and (2). For example, quid pro quo harassment arises if a supervisor
demands or implies that the woman must submit to his sexual demands or she will be
fired, demoted, denied a raise, promotion, or job assignment. See Bravo & Cassedy,
supra note 1, at 24.
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strictly liable. 3 The harasser in these cases has power over the terms
of employment of the individual subject to the harassment,2 4 there-
fore, the harasser is typically a supervisor or in a supervisory posi-
tion.' Although internal grievance procedures will not completely
shield this employer from liability,2 6 there is still an incentive for em-
ployers to implement effective internal grievance procedures because
these procedures may lead to an early settlement or, if there is litiga-
tion, less liability because the court probably will not award punitive
and compensatory damages.
Employers have an even stronger interest in providing effective
grievance procedures in hostile work environment cases 7 because
employers are not held strictly liable.' For example, in cases involv-
ing harassment by supervisory and non-supervisory co-workers, courts
require the employer to have at least constructive knowledge of the
harassment before attaching liability.29 Specifically, the court must
determine if the employer knew or should have known about the har-
23. See Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1038, 1042
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2693 (1994); Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d
777, 777 (1st Cir. 1990); Debra L. Raskin, Sexual Harassment in Employment, C902
A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study 589, 595 (1994).
24. See Raskin, supra note 23, at 595.
25. E.g., Dias v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 919 F.2d 1370, 1375-76 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding
the employer liable for sexual harassment by an employee acting within the scope of
his administrative duties), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 1294 (1992); Sparks v. Pilot Freight
Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1564 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding the employer directly
liable, without proof of respondeat superior, for a harasser who was plaintiff's super-
visor); Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 604-05 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding the em-
ployer liable, without actual or constructive knowledge, for harassment by a
supervisor); Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that
respondeat superior applies to conduct by a supervisor authorized "to hire, fire, disci-
pline, or promote"); cf. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70-71 (1986) ("The
courts have consistently held employers liable for the discriminatory discharges of
employees by supervisory personnel, whether or not the employer knew, should have
known, or approved of the supervisor's actions.").
26. See Raskin, supra note 23, at 595-96.
27. Hostile environment cases occur when the conduct of an employer, supervisor,
or co-worker unreasonably interferes with another employee's work performance or
creates an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment, even if sexual com-
pliance is not made contingent upon a term of employment. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(a)(3); Meritor, 477 U.S at 65. Such conduct may range from sexual innuen-
dos to abusive and vulgar language to physical sexual contact, but it must be suffi-
ciently pervasive to alter the work environment. Meritor, 477 U.S at 67 (quoting
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
28. See Janet Hugie Smith, C893 A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study 141, 151 (1994).
29. See Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 464-65 (7th Cir. 1990);
Baker v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 903 F.2d 1342, 1344 (10th Cir. 1990); Hall v. Gus Constr.
Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1015-16 (8th Cir. 1988); Kirkland v. Brinias, 741 F. Supp. 692, 694
(E.D. Tenn. 1989); Hunter v. Countryside Ass'n for the Handicapped, Inc., 723 F.
Supp. 1277, 1278-79 (N.D. 11. 1989); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1983);
See Michael J. Phillips, Employer Sexual Harassment Liability Under Agency Princi-
ples: A Second Look at Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 44 Vand. L Rev. 1229,
1238 (1991).
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assment and failed to take corrective action.30 Under these circum-
stances, an employer may be able to defend a claim by showing that
the employee failed to utilize the company's internal grievance proce-
dures.31 This defense is not automatic; the EEOC will examine the
company's procedure to determine its effectiveness. 32 Therefore, ef-
fective grievance procedures are of primary importance to the em-
ployer who wants to avoid liability.
Moreover, employers can avoid liability altogether for hostile work
environment claims by taking prompt corrective action.33 Therefore,
it is in the best interest of companies to implement both effective
grievance procedures and remedial measures to deal with complaints
of sexual harassment.
Avoiding liability through promoting internal grievance procedures
is a recent legal development. Until 1991, if an employer disregarded
a complaint of sexual harassment and subsequently lost at the admin-
istrative or court level, its liability was limited to equitable relief for
the plaintiff, such as backpay, injunctions, and attorney's fees.34 After
the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 35 however, Congress
expanded the remedies available under Title VII to include compensa-
tory and punitive damages.36 Now the stakes are higher for employers
to respond and resolve sexual harassment complaints as early as possi-
ble to avoid costly litigation awards.
Finally, informal dispute resolution has taken on a greater role as it
has become easier for aggrieved employees to establish a cause of ac-
30. See Phillips, supra note 29, at 1238.
31. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.11(c) and (d); see Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
72-73 (1986) (finding that employer's antidiscrimination policy did not insulate em-
ployer from liability because it did not specifically address sexual harassment, and it
required the employee to report the harassment to the defendant, her supervisor);
EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1516 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that plaintiff's
failure to use employer's internal grievance procedures did not insulate the employer
from liability because the employer did not explicitly ban sexual harassment and, it
required a preliminary report to the supervisor who engaged in or condoned the har-
assment); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 635 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding the em-
ployer's anti-harassment policy did not shield the employer from liability because it
required supervisors, who may be harassers, to be in charge of reporting and cor-
recting the harassment).
32. See Bravo & Cassedy, supra note 1, at 26. For example, the EEOC may con-
sider whether the employees know about the procedure, how they use it, and whether
they feel comfortable using it.
33. See Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d at 1515-16; Dornhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix
Corp., 828 F.2d 307, 309-10 (5th Cir. 1987); Hunter v. Countryside Ass'n for the
Handicapped, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 1277, 1279 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Silverstein v. Metroplex
Communications, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 863, 870 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
34. See United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1873 (1992) ("Title VII does not
allow awards for compensatory or punitive damages; instead, it limits available reme-
dies to backpay, injunctions, and other equitable relief.").
35. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(A) (1991).
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tion. For example, the Supreme Court in Harris v. Forklift Systems,
Inc.37 recently held that psychological injury was no longer part of a
prima facie case of sexual harassment in hostile environment cases.38
Moreover, courts are now more receptive to upholding claims of sex-
ual harassment than in the past.39 Companies may not want to risk
litigation, considering the increased likelihood the court will uphold
claims of sexual harassment. Consequently, as case law and statutes
dismantle the barriers to establishing a cause of action and collecting a
favorable remedy, employers are more likely to try to resolve sexual
harassment claims in-house.
B. Women's Interests in Informal Dispute Resolution
Informal dispute resolution is especially important for women try-
ing to resolve sexual harassment complaints. Sexual harassment is dif-
ferent from other types of discrimination precisely because sexuality is
at its core.' Women, employers, and society in general consider sexu-
ality to be within the private domain. As a result, and not surpris-
ingly, women often do not report sexual harassment.41 In addition,
women tend to avoid formal complaints because of the psychological
and economic effects of sexual harassment, as well as the inadequate
37. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
38. Idi
39. Despite its prevalence, sexual harassment is a recent legal phenomenon.
While sex discrimination became illegal with the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the courts were slower to recognize sexual harassment as a cause of action. The
first time a federal court upheld a claim of sexual harassment was in 1976. See Catha-
rine MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment- Its First Decade in Court (1986), in Feminism
Unmodified 103 (citing Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), followed
by Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). Almost 10 years later, the
Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson agreed that sexual harassment was
a legally cognizable claim. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
40. See Estrich, supra note 4, at 820 ("What makes sexual harassment more offen-
sive, more debilitating, and more dehumanizing to its victims than other forms of
discrimination is precisely the fact that it is sexual.").
41. See Bravo & Cassedy, supra note 1, at 52-53 (citing a 1980 survey in which of
the 42% of female federal employees who experienced sexual harassment, only two
percent reported it; and citing a 1987 follow-up survey in which the incidence of har-
assment remained the same and only five percent reported it); see also MacKinnon,
supra note 4, at 26 (citing numerous surveys including Clair Safron, What Men Do to
Women on the Job: Shocking Look at Sexual Harassment, Redbook, Nov. 1976) (find-
ing that 90% of the 9,000 women who responded to the survey reported experiencing
sexual harassment)). The underreporting of sexual harassment also can be inferred
from the large number of women who respond to studies stating that they are victims
of sexual harassment versus the number of cases that are adjudicated, even consider-
ing that not all reports of sexual harassment are legally actionable. Compare Barbara
A. Gutek, Sex and the Workplace 46 (1985) (reporting that 53% of women surveyed
responded that they were victims of sexual harassment) wit Silver, supra note 9, at
510 n.179 (citing Office of Pub. Affairs, EEOC, EEOC Litigation Activities 1978-1984
(1984)). The EEOC reports the number of Title VII cases (encompassing all areas of
discrimination under Title VII) filed by the EEOC, as well as those filed under all of
its jurisdictional bases, for each year. 326 cases in 1980; 368 in 1981; 164 in 1982; 195
in 1983; 310 in 1984). Id
1994]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
social and legal responses to the harassment. These factors not only
suggest why women do not report sexual harassment, but also illus-
trate why women, if they are going to report the harassment, will try
to resolve it in the most informal manner, namely through their com-
panies' internal grievance procedures. A closer examination of these
considerations emphasizes the strong interest women have in pursuing
informal dispute resolution.
One of the primary reasons why sexual harassment is underre-
ported is that women traditionally do not report crimes of a sexual
nature.42 Like rape, women's experiences of sexual harassment often
are violative on an extremely personal level. Another major reason
for underreporting is loss of privacy. 3 As the investigation into the
allegation of sexual harassment gets underway, and the harasser and
co-workers are questioned, the loss of privacy increases. Administra-
tive and judicial proceedings only prolong this invasion. In formaliz-
ing the conflict, women "know they will have to endure repeated
verbalizations of the specific sexual abuse they complain about."" Fi-
nally, women fear that their harasser will retaliate if they report the
conduct.4 5 Studies reveal that women fail to report sexual harassment
because of their vulnerability in the workplace, especially with regard
to their fear of retribution from superiors.46 This fear extends to both
the personal and professional level.47
Even when women do report sexual harassment, they are not likely
to pursue their charges beyond the informal stage of internal griev-
ance procedures and are more likely to settle. Reasons such as "[the]
fear of being laughed at, ostracized, vilified, humiliated, or retaliated
against by friends, co-workers, bosses, lawyers, judges, and juries '48
contribute to women's preference for informal proceedings. These
fears are critical to understanding why informal resolution is so impor-
tant. As Professor Catharine MacKinnon notes, "[like women who
are raped, sexually harassed women feel humiliated, degraded,
ashamed, embarrassed, and cheap, as well as angry."4 9 She also points
out that "the specific injury of sexual harassment arises from the
nexus between a sexual demand and the workplace."50 Consequently,
women are apprehensive about reporting sexual harassment due to
42. See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 Yale U. 1087, 1157-61 (1986) ("Rape is the most
underreported crime in America and the conviction rate is notably low.").
43. See Bravo & Cassedy, supra note 1, at 53 (Dr. Mary Rowe, an expert on sexual
harassment from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, finds that "[flear [of] retalia-
tion and a loss of privacy" are two primary responses to sexual harassment.).
44. See MacKinnon, supra note 39, at 114.
45. Id.
46. See Gutek, supra note 41, at 72 (survey indicates that 60% of women did not
report sexual harassment because of fear they would be blamed).
47. See Bravo & Cassedy, supra note 1, at 40-49.
48. Bravo & Cassedy, supra note 1, at 54.
49. MacKinnon, supra note 4, at 47.
50. Id. at 31.
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both the anticipated and established range of reactions to their com-
plaints, from ignoring,5 disbelieving,52 or trivializing them,53 to the
perception of the woman as blameworthy' or unprofessional. 55
The interplay of intimacy, sexuality, and economics also influences
women's preference to deal with sexual harassment through non-ad-
versarial means. The economic dependency of women on their em-
ployers silences many victims. 56 This problem arises because of
women's historic and current economic subordination in the market-
place, which exposes them to sexual abuse and restricts their capacity
to combat such abuse. Professor MacKinnon notes that sexual harass-
ment "deprives women of material security and independence which
could help make resistance to unreasonable job pressures practical."' s
Inequities built into sexual harassment case law also deter women
from fully engaging in the adversarial system. The law's response to
sexual harassment is best understood by comparing it to how the law
treats other sexual violations, such as rape, which are overwhelmingly
perpetrated by men against women. Professor Susan Estrich finds
that the legal doctrines that shape rape laws effectively re-victimize
the rape victim.5 8 Because the legal doctrines shaping sexual harass-
ment law are similar to rape law, women can be re-victimized, and
thus are unlikely to report the violation.59
In order to demonstrate how the legal doctrines that form the law
deter formal complaints, a comparison of harassment and date rape
case law illustrates the developing concerns of silencing the victim.
Both sexual harassment and date rape are relatively recent social and
legal conceptions, whose acceptance has been marked by heightened
skepticism due to both the sexual nature of the claim and the familiar-
ity of the victim and the perpetrator. Sexual harassment, like date
51. See Bravo & Cassedy, supra note 1, at 57-58 (discussing instances of company
superiors ignoring women's complaints of sexual harassment).
52. E.g., Robinson v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 880, 881 (D. Del. 1979) (concluding that the plaintiff "irrationally miscon-
strued" a series of sexual intimations).
53. E.g., Sand v. George P. Johnson Co., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 716,727(E.D. Mich. 1982) (holding defendant's conduct not actionable because it was only a
flirtation).
54. E.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986) (stating that "com-
plainant's sexually provocative speech or dress is [not] irrelevant as a matter of law"
and approving examination of her "sexual fantasies" in determining whether harass-
ment occurred).
55. Women in traditionally male-dominated occupations become "special targets"
and are particularly vulnerable to sexual harassment. Bravo & Cassedy, supra note 1,
at 63.
56. See MacKinnon, supra note 4, at 9.
57. Id.
58. See Estrich, supra note 4, at 814-15.
59. See Estrich, supra note 42, at 1161-63; see also B. Glenn George, The Back
Door: Legitimizing Sexual Harassment Claims, 73 B.U. L Rev. 1 (1993) (proposing
that courts redress sexual harassment to the same extent they remedy other Title VII
violations).
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rape, lacks the legal redress of other non-sexual transgressions. For
example, the victim's behavior, not the harasser's, may become the
focal point of inquiry. Specifically, the Supreme Court has ruled that
courts may consider a plaintiff's past behavior, including dress and
sexual fantasies, in making a determination of sexual harassment.60
Personal considerations, societal prejudices, and legal biases, there-
fore, hinder women's ability to deal with sexual harassment in a con-
frontational fashion. Informal dispute resolution provides women
with a less adversarial forum in which they and their employers can
attempt to redress the harassment. Generally, women can get the
maximum out of informal dispute resolution if their interests are pro-
tected by counsel.
C. Resolving the Divergent Interests of Women and Employers:
Advocacy at the Informal Level
Although women and their employers may have different interests
in seeking informal dispute resolution for sexual harassment claims,
their concerns suggest that in-house procedures are the optimal forum
for these disputes. In order to assure the fairness and effectiveness of
these proceedings, however, both sides must have access to legal
counsel. The imperative of having an attorney at this informal level is
especially strong for women. For those subject to sexual harassment,
retaining an attorney increases the likelihood of obtaining a positive
result-both in terms of settlement or subsequent litigation.6 For in-
stance, an attorney facilitates the process of collecting evidence and
presenting it in such a way to demonstrate that her client has a strong
case,62 thus encouraging settlement.
The attorney for the aggrieved employee also functions to keep the
informal dispute resolution procedures neutral. A company's internal
grievance procedures, by definition, are conducted by the company.
Both the fact-finding procedures and the adjudication may appear to
be neutral, but the position of the fact-finders and adjudicators within
60. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 61 (1986).
61. See Mark D. Laponsky, Procedural Problems and Considerations in Represent-
ing Federal Employees in Equal Employment Opportunity Disputes, 29 How. L.J. 503
(1986). Mark Laponsky advises that:
[Tihe employee's contentions should be made and formulated into clear and
precise allegation for presentation to the [EEO] counselor .... [T]he attor-
ney's active involvement during this period [is] advisable to ensure that the
counselor's inquiry is complete and that all matters to be complained about
have been raised.... Counsel should always prepare the client for this inter-
view [with the EEOC] in the same way they would prepare the client for a
deposition or a hearing.... Counsel may aid the investigator by focusing on
the salient issues and facts. Counsel may identify witnesses for the investiga-
tor to interview, suggest questions to be asked, or identify the types of docu-
ments to be located and the statistics to be evaluated.
Id. at 510-16.
62. Id.
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the company calls into question their impartiality. An attorney helps
ensure the fairness of the procedures, and consequently the equity of
the settlement.
The presence of an attorney also serves to achieve the most
favorable settlement for the aggrieved employee. Alternatively, if the
parties do not reach settlement, the attorney is necessary to preserve
the cause of action for later litigation. The assistance of an attorney at
this stage, therefore, is crucial in developing and maintaining the
cause of action.
Another important function of an attorney is to foster an aggrieved
employee's bargaining power. This role is especially important be-
cause the employee faces specific obstacles in bringing charges of sex-
ual harassment. For example, the aggrieved employee is at a
disadvantage because of the unequal bargaining power inherent in the
employer/employee relationship.6 3 This is compounded for women,
who are relatively weak economic actors.64
A final and critical reason for women to obtain legal counsel at this
level is the presence of the employers' attorneys. Employers normally
consult attorneys when setting up internal dispute resolution proce-
dures and conducting these procedures for a specific claim. Likewise,
women should be able to afford counsel in informal proceedings, as
Congress provided through the passage of section 706(k) of Title
VII. 6 5
Title VII's attorney fee-shifting provision is the vehicle to effectuate
meaningful representation for aggrieved employees to assist them in
obtaining relief through informal dispute resolution.66 The denial of
attorney's fees amounts to informal proceedings functioning not only
63. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984).
64. For example, men earn 59% more than women. Bureau of Census, U.S. Dep't
of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, tbl. 737 (1990). In addition,
women are under-represented in positions of influence in the government. See
Center for American Women & Politics, Women in Elective Office 1989: Fact Sheet
(1989) (reporting that in 1989, women were represented in 5% of federal elective
offices, 14% of state executive elective offices, 17% of state legislative seats, and 9%
of county governing board positions). Likewise, women generally do not hold high-
paying executive management positions. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, A Report on the
Glass Ceiling (1991). A survey of 92 of America's top corporations found that women
comprise 6.6% of executive management, 16.9% of management, and 37.2% of em-
ployees. Id. In contrast, women are over-represented in lower-paying service and ad-
ministrative jobs. See The American Woman 1992-93, 153-55 (Paula Ries & Anne J.
Stone eds., 1992). In 1990,46% of women who worked were employed in such jobs as
secretaries, waitresses, and health aides. Id. Notably, men who were employed in
these same positions had higher median weekly wages. For example, the female/male
weekly salary for a secretary is $341/$387 and for a wait staff is $194/S266. Id.
65. See discussion infra part III.A.
66. Providing for the shifting of attorney's fees will not remedy every ill, but it
may alleviate some of the economic burdens involved in bringing a claim. Because
women occupy the lower echelon of the workforce, their ability to afford an attorney
is of great importance. See sources cited supra note 64.
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as a shield for employers, but also a sword against women, who cannot
afford to retain private counsel to protect their civil rights. Congress,
recognizing this economic barrier to obtaining counsel, has incorpo-
rated attorney fee-shifting as an integral aspect Title VII.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF TITLE VII PROCEDURES
Procedural devices including informal dispute resolution,67 adminis-
trative proceedings,68 and court actions 69 are the basic mechanisms
utilized to enforce compliance with Title VII. When an aggrieved em-
ployee has a grievance, she must file her charge with the EEOC
before she can institute a lawsuit.71 If this filing occurs before exhaus-
tion of remedies in the available state or local Fair Employment Prac-
tice Agencies, the EEOC refers the charge to the appropriate
agency.71 If the EEOC finds no discrimination, it will dismiss the
charge and issue a notice of a right to sue, which enables the aggrieved
employee to initiate civil proceedings on her own.72 If the EEOC
finds reasonable cause to believe that employment discrimination oc-
curred, it assists the aggrieved employee in vindicating her right to be
free from sexual harassment.73
Title VII encourages informal dispute resolution.74 The statute
mandates that the EEOC "shall make an investigation" after a charge
67. Title VII incorporates informal dispute resolution procedures by requiring the
EEOC to engage in "informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion" in
order to resolve discrimination complaints. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Informal dispute
resolution includes a company's internal grievance procedures.
68. Title VII requires administrative proceedings before an aggrieved employee
can institute a federal court action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(f)(1).
69. A court action is the final step to remedying employment discrimination, and
only can be instituted after the aggrieved employee files her complaint with the
EEOC, attempts conciliation with her employer, and finishes her administrative pro-
ceedings. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1); see generally Mack A. Player, Employment Discrim-
ination Law §§ 5.71-5.73(a) (1988) (discussing the general filing requirements for fil-
ing discrimination claims).
71. Id. "[N]o charge may be filed [with the EEOC] by the person aggrieved
before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the
State or local law... ." The EEOC refers and defers charges to agencies called "FEP
Agencies." 29 C.F.R. § 1601.70(a).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (stating that 180 days after filing with the EEOC, a
charging party has the right to receive a notice of the right to sue from the EEOC if
the agency's conciliatory efforts fail and the EEOC (or the Attorney General if it is a
governmental entity) has not filed a civil suit).
73. Id.
74. Informal dispute resolution includes a company's internal grievance proce-
dures, which vary in formality. To define informal dispute resolution in the negative,
it is any type of proceedings which courts do not consider mandatory-proceedings
other than federal or state administrative proceedings, see, e.g., New York Gaslight
Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 71 (1980) (holding administrative proceedings are a
proceeding under section 706(k)), or court proceedings. Fischer v. Adams, 572 F.2d
406 (1st Cir. 1978) (awarding petitioner attorney's fees for work done at the adminis-
trative level); Parker v. Califano, 561 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (affirming award of
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is filed.75 In addition, the EEOC "shall endeavor to eliminate any
such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of
conference, conciliation, and persuasion. '76 Title VII, therefore,
grants the EEOC investigative powers as well as the authority to re-
dress the harassment through informal dispute resolution.
To encourage enforcement of Title VII, the statute contains section
706(k), granting courts the discretionary power to award reasonable
attorney's fees to a "prevailing party"'7 "[i[n any action or proceed-
ing.",7 8 Title VII, however, fails to specify what types of proceedings
are within the meaning of section 706(k)'s "action or proceeding,"
which would permit a court to award attorney's fees to a prevailing
party. The EEOC regulations provide that the prevailing party may
recover "reasonable attorney's fees or costs incurred in the processing
of the complaint. '79 The regulation specifies that:
Attorney's fees shall be paid only for services performed after the
filing of the complaint required... and after the complainant has
notified the agency that he or she is represented by an attorney,
except that fees are allowable for a reasonable period of time prior
attorney's fees under Title VII for services rendered during administrative proceed-
ings); Foster v. Boorstin, 561 F.2d 340 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (awarding attorney's fees
which include compensation for services rendered at administrative level); Johnson v.
United States, 554 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1977) (petitioner awarded attorney's fees under
Title VII after bringing court action challenging adverse administrative decision).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (emphasis added).
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The statutory language does not provide an explicit
definition of what types of proceedings qualify an aggrieved employee as a "prevail-
ing party." The Supreme Court, however, interprets "prevailing party" to include one
who serves as a catalyst to enforce her substantive rights. See, e.g., Dover v. Rose, 709
F.2d 436, 439 (6th Cir. 1983) (defining prevailing party as one who obtains a settle-
ment, or whose "lawsuit acts as a 'catalyst' which causes the defendant to make signif-
icant changes in its past practices"); Sullivan v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Labor and
Industry, 663 F.2d 443, 448 (3d Cir. 1981) (awarding fees for a union arbitration which
"acted as a 'catalyst' for the vindication of [the aggrieved party's] constitutional
rights"), cerL denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433
F.2d 421, 429 (8th Cir. 1970) (basing fee recovery for plaintiff's lawsuit, which "acted
as a catalyst which prompted [the defendant] to take action" to remedy the discrimi-
nation). In addition, a complainant can be a "prevailing party" through settlement.
See Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980) (holding that the parallel attorney fee-
shifting provision 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is not conditioned upon "full litigation of the issues
or on a judicial determination that the plaintiff's rights have been violated").
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) ("In any action or proceeding under this subchapter
the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... reasonable attorney's
fee[s] .... ").
Although the award of attorney's fees is discretionary according to the statute, case
law dictates that for a prevailing plaintiff, a court should deny attorney's fee only
under "special circumstances." Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S 412,
417 (1978). The same is not true for a prevailing defendant, who must meet a higher
standard to recover attorney's fees. The plaintiff's claim must be "frivolous, unrea-
sonable, or groundless;" merely winning the case is not sufficient. Id. at 422.
79. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.271(d).
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to the notification of representation for any services performed in
reaching a determination to represent the complainant.80
Despite the EEOC regulations, courts disagree as to when and for
which proceedings fee awards under section 706(k) are appropriate.
The Supreme Court has construed section 706(k) as incorporating
state administrative proceedings; thus, fee awards are proper at the
state administrative level.8' Although the Court has yet to determine
whether the attorney fee-shifting provision applies to informal dispute
resolution, the current trend in the lower courts is to deny recovery of
attorney's fees for work performed during this process.82
III. THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF
SECTION 706(K)
Courts analyze the limited legislative history of section 706(k) in
determining whether to award attorney's fees for informal dispute res-
olution. The current trend is to deny such fees, which creates inequi-
ties for aggrieved employees.
A. The Legislative History of Section 706(k)
The legislative history of section 706(k), although "sparse," indi-
cates a liberal view of shifting attorney's fees.83 In 1964, Senator
Humphrey stated that the attorney fee-shifting provision would
"make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a meritorious
suit,"'84 and in 1987, the Supreme Court emphasized that "it is clear
that [this is] one of Congress' primary purposes in enacting [section
706(k)]."8 5
Moreover, the language of section 706(k)-permitting the shifting
of fees for a prevailing party "[i]n any action or proceeding" 86-indi-
cates that Congress envisioned a proceeding as something separate
from a court action, so that "or proceeding" is not "mere surplus-
age."87 For example, Title II only permits fees for "actions," not pro-
ceedings.88 The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976
80. Id. at 1613.271(d)(iv).
81. New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980).
82. See infra parts III.B.
83. 110 Cong. Rec. 12,724 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); see also S. Rep.
No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976) ("In the civil rights area, Congress has in-
structed the courts to use the broadest and most effective remedies [including attor-
ney's fee awards] available to achieve the goals of our civil rights laws.").
84. 110 Cong. Rec. 12,724 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
85. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 420 (1978) (quoting 110
Cong. Rec. 12,724 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
87. New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 61 (1980).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1988).
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("section 1988"),9 an analogous fee-shifting statute, also encompasses
an "action or proceeding;" a proposed amendment to the act to cover
only an "action" was rejected.9'
Because 706(k) was the model for section 1988,91 the two provisions
are not only similar,' but also share the same goals.93 The legislative
history of section 1988 more fully explains the goals of the fee-shifting
statute. In enacting fee-shifting statutes, such as section 1988, Con-
gress clearly acknowledged the importance of awarding attorney's
fees to vindicate civil rights:
The effective enforcement of federal civil rights statutes depends
largely oh the efforts of private citizens. Although some agencies of
the United States have civil rights responsibilities, their authority
and resources are limited. In many instances where these laws are
violated, it is necessary for the citizen to initiate a court action to
correct the illegality. Unless the judicial remedy is full and com-
plete, it will remain a meaningless right. Because a vast majority of
the victims of civil rights violations cannot afford legal counsel, they
are unable to present their cases to the courts. In authorizing an
award of reasonable attorney's fees [section 1988] is designed to
give such persons effective access to the judicial process where their
grievances can be resolved according to the law.94
Similarly, the goal of section 706(k) is to encourage attorneys to
represent civil rights litigants; attorneys are less likely to do so if they
89. Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1988 & Supp. III 1992)).
90. 122 Cong. Rec. 32,933 (1976) (Senator Helms proposed a written amendment
to section 1988 deleting the words "or proceeding," which was rejected by a large
majority).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1989 & Supp. IV 1992). S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 4 (1976) states that "[ilt is intended that the standards for awarding fees [under
section 1988] be generally the same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act."
92. In relevant part, Title VII provides:
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter [42 U.S.C. § 2000e] the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Com-
mission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee (including expert
fees) as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be
liable for costs the same as a private person.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
In relevant part, the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 provides:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1977, 1978,
1979, 1980, and 1981 of the Revised Statutes [42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983,
1985, 1986], title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. § 2000d], or title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. § 2000d], the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fees as part of the costs.
42 U.S.C. § 1988.
93. 122 Cong. Rec. 35,122 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Fish that the legislative intent
of section 1988 is to "give the federal courts discretion to award attorney's fees ... to
remedy anomalous gaps in our civil rights laws... and to achieve consistency").
94. H.R. Rep. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976).
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do not know at the outset whether their fees can be recovered. The
same rationale of providing access to the courts by financially en-
abling aggrieved parties to assert their civil rights should apply to in-
formal dispute resolution. Otherwise, parties of limited means must
forgo this informal level or pay attorney's fees they cannot afford.
Congress stated that Title VII's procedures and remedies should
"mes[h] nicely, logically, and coherently with the State and city legis-
lation."95 Similarly, the Supreme Court recognized that state agencies
have "a limited opportunity to resolve problems of employment dis-
crimination and thereby to make unnecessary resort to federal relief
by victims of the discrimination."96 Informal dispute resolution, spe-
cifically internal grievance procedures, can fill this void. Thus, while
the statutory scheme of Title VII encourages informal dispute resolu-
tion,' denial of attorney's fees at this level creates an economic bar-
rier to the use of informal proceedings, and ultimately the
enforcement of civil rights.9"
Denying attorney's fees for informal dispute resolution undercuts
Congress' goal to provide alternative means of redressing employ-
ment discrimination. The integral role of informal dispute resolution
in Title VII should be preserved.99 Therefore, to give Title VII teeth
and fulfill legislative intent, section 706(k) should apply to provide for
the shifting of attorney's fees at every level where a violation of em-
ployment discrimination is redressed. The case law, however, has
largely ignored these underlying considerations in interpreting section
706(k).
B. Case Law Regarding Fee-Shifting under Section 706(k)
When section 706(k) is applied to informal dispute resolution pro-
cedures, the case law suggests a trend to deny awarding attorney's
fees. Ultimately, however, the rationales behind this trend are flawed
because they fail to take into account the significance of informal dis-
pute resolution.
1. Section 706(k) Supreme Court Litigation
The legislative history of Title VII offers limited guidance in deter-
mining whether an aggrieved employee, who obtains relief through
informal dispute resolution, may benefit from section 706(k). Lower
courts, therefore, heavily rely on the Supreme Court's analysis of sec-
95. 110 Cong. Rec. 7,205 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark).
96. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 755 (1979).
97. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
98. See sources cited supra note 64 (discussing the economic status of women as
victims of sexual harassment).
99. Title VII dictates that under the auspices of the EEOC, the aggrieved em-
ployee and her employer must seek to resolve the complaint through "informal meth-
ods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
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tion 706(k) in New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey."°° In Carey, the
plaintiff instituted a federal suit to collect attorney's fees incurred dur-
ing state administrative proceedings. Before this federal court action,
the plaintiff filed an employment discrimination complaint with the
EEOC alleging that her employer, New York Gaslight Club, refused
to hire her because of her race.'0 ' Although the plaintiff was success-
ful at the state administrative level, she received only an offer of em-
ployment and backpay, not attorney's fees." m
The district court in Carey denied the request for attorney's fees
under 706(k).' 3 The court reasoned that because state law provided a
meritorious complainant with a division attorney, the plaintiff did not
need to hire a private attorney and incur legal expenses."° '
The Court of Appeals reversed, noting several important factors.1°n
In particular, the court noted that fees should be awarded for the fol-
lowing reasons: to encourage the complainant to retain private coun-
sel because a division attorney assists the complainant only at certain
points during the state proceedings; °6 to avoid promoting "needless
litigation;' 0 7 to further the congressional intent behind Title VII's
scheme which promotes the role of state agencies; 08 and to help pro-
vided for the complete development of the administrative record.'0 9
The Supreme Court also examined these factors in affirming the
Court of Appeals,"10 and held that attorney fee-shifting under Title
VII encompasses these state administrative proceedings."'
100. 447 U.S. 54 (1980).
101. Id. at 56. As required under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f)(l), the EEOC
deferred the complaint to the appropriate New York administrative agency. Id. at 56-
57.
102. At this point, the EEOC issued to respondent a notice of a right to sue. The
respondent then filed a federal claim to recover attorney's fees for the work done in
state administrative proceedings. Id at 58.
103. Carey v. New York Gaslight Club, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 79, 80-81 (S.D.N.Y.
1978).
104. Id at 81.
105. Carey v. New York Gaslight Club, Inc., 598 F.2d 1253, 1259-60 (2d Cir. 1979).
106. Id. at 1258-59.
107. Id. at 1259.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1259-60.
110. New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 60 (1980).
111. Id. The Supreme Court rejected the three main arguments presented by the
company against awarding attorney's fees. Id. at 66-67. First, the Court repudiated
the argument that there is a violation of the Tenth Amendment when a federal court
orders an award of attorney's fees when the State (here, New York) does not permit
such an award by noting that the power given to Congress by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, § 5 outweighs any interest the State may have in denying fee awards. Id. Sec-
ond, the Court countered the argument that awarding attorney's fees pre-empts state
law, which surpasses Congressional intent, by explaining that Title VII's attorney fee-
shifting provision does not "supplant" state law, but rather "supplement[s]" it. Id. at
67-68 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48-49 (1974)). Third,
the Court denied the argument that the District Court should use its discretion to
deny attorney's fees because, while the Congressional grant to deny fees is discretion-
19941
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In Carey, the Supreme Court pronounced that "the language and
history of the statute, the nature of the proceedings in which respon-
dent participated, and the relationship of those proceedings to Title
VII's enforcement mechanisms, together persuade us that Congress
clearly intended to authorize awards of attorney's fees to persons in
respondent's situation.""' 2 The Court found that Congress' use of
"the broadly inclusive disjunctive phrase 'action or proceeding' " in-
cludes "[administrative] proceedings" that are not necessarily court
actions." 3 To hold otherwise, the Court stated, the phrase "or pro-
ceeding" would be "mere surplusage." ' 4
In addition, although the word "proceeding" in the statute arguably
refers only to federal administrative proceedings, the Court did not
believe that Congress intended to make this distinction." 5 Instead,
the Court noted that "other provisions of the statute that interact with
706(k); the purpose of 706(k); the humanitarian remedial policies of
Title VII; and the statute's structure of cooperation between federal
and state enforcement authorities" suggest that Congress intended to
permit recovery of attorney's fees for state administrative
proceedings." 6
Carey also discussed the mandatory nature of state administrative
proceedings as the reason why attorney fee-shifting is appropriate
under Title VII,117 although the Court's analysis was not exclusively
ary, the court should not exercise it unless there are "special circumstances," which
were absent here. Id. at 68 (citations omitted).
112. Id. at 61.
113. Id. Furthermore, other civil rights attorney fee-shifting provisions, such as Ti-
tle II, omit the word "proceeding" and only include an "action." Id. (discussing Title
II, § 204(b), which was enacted contemporaneously with Title VII's attorney fee-shift-
ing provision and permits an award only for "any action commenced pursuant to this
title").
114. Id. at 63.
115. Id. at 62.
116. Id. The Court stated more broadly that "[o]ne aspect of complete relief [of
employment discrimination] is an award of attorney's fees, which Congress consid-
ered necessary for the fulfillment of federal goals." Id. at 67-68. Permitting fee
awards upholds "Congress' intent to encourage full use of state remedies." Id. at 66
n.6.
117. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority of the Court, carefully worded the
decision to hold that recovery of attorney's fees is appropriate for "state proceedings
to which the complainant was referred pursuant to the provisions of Title VII." Id. at
71. Justice Stevens' concurrence emphasized that an award of attorney's fees was
proper in this case because petitioner filed a federal court action on the merits under-
lying the dispute, not solely to recover attorney's fees. Id. The majority, however,
pronounced that attorney fee awards "[s]hould not depend upon whether the com-
plaint ultimately finds it necessary to sue in federal court to obtain relief other than
attorney's fees." Id. at 66. Justices White and Rehnquist, in dissent, agreed with the
reasoning in the dissent of Judge Mulligan of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. Id. at 71. Judge Mulligan contended that permitting a party to file a federal
action to recover attorney's fees incurred during state administrative actions would
encourage these types of federal suits. Carey v. New York Gaslight Club, Inc., 598
F.2d 1253, 1260 (2d Cir. 1979) (Mulligan, J., dissenting).
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premised on this. For example, the Carey Court pronounced, "It
would be anomalous to award fees to the complainant who is unsuc-
cessful or only partially successful in obtaining state or local remedies,
but to deny an award to the complainant who is successful in fulfilling
Congress' plan that federal policies be vindicated at the state or local
level."" 8 In addition, the Court concluded that to deny fee awards at
the state administrative level would create "an incentive to get into
federal court."" 9
Finally, Carey discussed the role of the private attorney in obtaining
relief for the aggrieved employee. Contrary to the district court, 120
the Supreme Court found that:
It is thus obvious that the assistance provided a complainant by the
Division attorney is not fully adequate, and that the attorney has no
obligation to the complainant as a client. In fact, at times the posi-
tion of the Division may be detrimental to the interests of the com-
plainant and to enforcement of federal rights.12'
The Court highlighted the fact that state law does not provide a divi-
sion attorney to investigate the complaint,' 22 to help with preliminary
settlements,' 23 or necessarily to take the client's position if there is an
appeal. 24 Therefore, unless the aggrieved employee hires her own
counsel, she will be unrepresented at the preliminary stages of adjudi-
cation, specifically informal dispute resolution, because an attorney is
assigned only when the conciliatory efforts fail and a hearing is sched-
uled. 25 The Court succinctly summed up that "[r]etention of private
counsel will help assure that federal rights are not compromised in the
conciliation process.""
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Carey in 1982 in White v. New
Hampshire Department of Employment Security."-' The Court, quot-
ing Carey, held that a party who prevails at the administrative level
may then file "solely to obtain an award of attorney's fees for legal
118. 447 U.S. at 66.
119. Id. at 66 n.6.
120. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
121. New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 70 (1980).
122. Id. ("Representation by a private attorney thus assures development of a com-
plete factual record at the investigative stage and at the administrative hearing.").
123. Id. ("A Division [attorney] cannot act as the complainant's attorney for pur-
poses of advising him whether to accept a settlement.").
124. Id. ("The Division attorney is authorized only to support the order entered by
the Division or the Appeal Board.").
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. 455 U.S. 445, 451-52 n.13 (1982).
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work done in state and local proceedings."' 28 In 1986, however, the
Court declared that the original language from Carey was dictum. 129
While the Supreme Court has not expressly overruled Carey, its
later rulings on analogous fee-shifting statutes, notably section 1988,
indicate the Court's increasingly restrictive view towards fee awards.
The Court has yet to address the issue of whether courts, in an in-
dependent action, can award attorney's fees for other types of pro-
ceedings under Title VII.
2. Analogous Supreme Court Litigation
The Supreme Court's decision in Carey seemed to signal a trend in
favor of allowing recovery of attorney's fees for informal proceedings.
By 1985, however, the tide again shifted as the Supreme Court handed
down several decisions regarding fee-shifting in analogous civil rights
statutes.
The first case to take a more restrictive view of Carey was in 1985 in
Webb v. County Board of Education.3 ' The Webb Court held that the
district court was "well within the range of reasonable discretion" to
deny recovery of attorney's fees incurred in a nonmandatory state ad-
ministrative action for a party who later prevailed in a section 1983
federal court action.13 1
The plaintiff Webb, an elementary school teacher, alleged that his
dismissal was racially motivated, and unsuccessfully challenged it
under state law, which entitled him to a hearing. 32 Webb then filed a
section 1983 action in federal court that was settled by a consent or-
der, which reserved for the future the issue of attorney's fees.' 33
The district court held that Webb was not entitled to recover attor-
ney's fees for the School Board hearings.3 The Sixth Circuit and the
Supreme Court affirmed. 35 The Supreme Court disregarded plain-
tiff's reliance on Carey, finding it inapplicable because section 1983
128. Id. (stating that "a claimed entitlement to attorney's fees is sufficiently in-
dependent of the merits action under Title VII to support a federal suit 'solely to
obtain an award of attorney's fees for legal work done in state and local proceed-
ings' ") (quoting Carey, 447 U.S. at 66).
129. North Carolina Dep't of Transp. v. Crest St. Community Council, Inc., 479
U.S. 6, 13-14 (1986) (citing Carey, 447 U.S. at 66).
130. 471 U.S. 234 (1985).
131. Id. at 244.
132. Id. Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-511(a) (1983) provides that a teacher cannot be
dismissed without cause, and if the teacher contests the grounds of dismal, he is enti-
tled to a hearing pursuant to § 49-5-512. The School Board conducted a series of
hearings, but reaffirmed his dismissal. Webb, 471 U.S. at 236-37.
133. Id. at 237.
134. Id. at 239.
135. Webb v. County Bd. of Educ., 715 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 471 U.S. 234(1985).
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does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies as does Title
VII.13 6
In 1986, a year after Webb, the Supreme Court in North Carolina
Department of Transportation v. Crest Street Community Counci11"
held that fee-shifting is impermissible under section 1988 for a party
who prevails in federal administrative proceedings and subsequently
files a suit to recover attorney's fees. 138 The petitioner, Crest Street
Community Council, Inc., filed a complaint with the United States
Department of Transportation against the North Carolina Depart-
ment of Transportation's proposed extension of a federally funded
highway through a predominantly black neighborhood in Durham.1 39
The federal Department of Transportation determined that prob-
able cause existed to substantiate the claim and encouraged the de-
partment to negotiate with Crest.140 Two years later, Crest, the state
department, and the City of Durham reached a preliminary agree-
ment, and after six months, the state department moved to dissolve
the previous injunction.' 4'
In the district court, Crest then moved to intervene in the action
involving the injunction and submitted a proposed complaint. Crest's
petition was pending when the district court entered into a consent
judgment favorable to Crest that included dissolving the injunction
and dismissing Crest's complaint.142
The consent judgment did not resolve the issue of attorney's fees
for the five years of work amounting to over 12,000 hours for services
rendered. Crest instituted another action solely to recover fees in-
curred for the investigation and negotiation of the dispute. 4 3 The dis-
trict court held that section 1988 did not permit a fee award in this
situation, and therefore granted summary judgment for the federal
Department of Transportation.' 44
The Fourth Circuit unanimously reversed.145 Relying on Carey, the
court concluded that this federal administrative proceeding was a
136. Webb, 471 U.S. at 240. The Court further stated that the only kind of "action
or proceeding" that qualifies a prevailing party for recovery of attorney's fees are
those that are necessary to enforce section 1983, which the School Board proceedings
were not. Id. at 241. The Court emphasized that "[a]dministrative proceedings estab-
lished to enforce -tenure rights created by state law simply are not any part of the
proceedings to enforce section 1983." Id.
137. 479 U.S. 6 (1986).
138. Id. at 15.
139. Id. at 9. There was already an injunction issued in a separate action against the
construction of the highway extension.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 10.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Crest St. Community Council, Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 598 F.
Supp. 258 (M.D.N.C. 1984), rev'd, 769 F.2d 1025 (4th Cir. 1985), revd, 479 U.S. 6
(1986).
145. 769 F.2d 1025, 1028-29 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 479 U.S. 6 (1986).
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"proceeding to enforce ... title VI," and thus recovery of attorney's
fees was proper. 46 In addition, the court emphasized that "Congress'
expressed policy of uniformity among the fee statutes [would] be fur-
thered by adopting the same construction of the same language.' 47
Specifically, under Carey, attorney's fees are available under section
706(k), and should likewise be available under section 1988.
Although the Supreme Court in Crest characterized the attorneys'
work as "substantial and concrete,' 48 it reversed and remanded. 49
The Court insisted on a narrow reading of the statute in which admin-
istrative proceedings were included in the "plain language" of section
1988150 and its legislative history.' 51 The Crest court regarded as dic-
tum the language in Carey that Title VII creates "authorization of a
civil suit in federal court encompass[ing] a suit solely to obtain an
award of attorney's fees for legal work done in state and local pro-
ceedings."' 52 The Court limited Carey to Justice Stevens' concur-
rence, which focused on the fact that the filing of the Title VII action
occurred while the administrative proceedings were pending. 5 3 Crest
distinguished the party filing an independent action to recover attor-
ney's fees (i.e., subsequent to the successful resolution of administra-
tive proceedings), who cannot recover fees, from the party filing a
federal suit prior to obtaining a successful resolution at the adminis-
trative level, who can recover fees. 54
The rationale behind Crest, which creates a different standard for
awarding attorney's fees where the aggrieved party files a federal suit
before or after resolution of the administrative proceedings, is that
section 1988 does not explicitly refer to fee awards for administrative
proceedings or subsequent suits to obtain fee awards. The Court justi-
fied its denial of fees on that basis by stating that "[t]he short answer
is that Congress did not write the statute that way."' 55
The Crest Court resolved the potential problem raised in Carey-
the escalation in the number of civil rights suits filed in federal court
to ensure obtaining attorney fee awards156 -by noting that the client's
needs, not the counsel's need to receive payment, will motivate com-
146. Id. at 1028-29 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
147. Id. at 1029.
148. 479 U.S. 6, 10 (1986).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 11-12, 16.
151. Id. at 12-13 (citing S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976); H.R. Rep.
No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976)).
152. Id. at 13-14 (citing Carey, 447 U.S. at 66).
153. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Carey, 447 U.S. at 71).
154. Id.
155. Id. (citing Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 79 (1984). "[T]he legislative
history clearly envisions that attorney's fees would be awarded for proceedings only
when those proceedings are part of or followed by a lawsuit." Id. (quoting Garcia, 469
U.S. at 79).
156. Carey, 447 U.S. at 66 n.6.
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petent counsel." 7 Specifically, the Court would not presume that "an
attorney will advise the client to forgo an available avenue of relief
solely because § 1988 does not provide for attorney's fees."'158
The Carey, Webb, Crest trilogy influenced lower court decisions re-
garding whether fees are available for the successful resolution of a
Title VII claim through informal procedures. The post-Careylpre-
Webb and pre-Crest Title VII cases fall in favor of permitting fee
awards for informal dispute resolution, while the post-Webb and post-
Crest cases come out against awarding such fees. Thus, section 1988
litigation influenced section 706(k) litigation to the extent that the
emerging trend is to disallow attorney's fees for services rendered for
informal dispute resolution under Title VII.
3. Lower Courts Permitting Recovery of Attorney's Fees
Post-Carey and pre-Webb and pre-Crest courts favor recovery of at-
torney's fees for informal procedures. Relying on New York Gaslight
Club, Inc. v. Carey,'59 these courts stress the Carey Court's reasoning
rather than its language, which speaks of mandatory proceedings.
They do not interpret the Supreme Court's references to mandatory
proceedings as a guideline for determining what proceedings fall
within the meaning of section 706(k), but consider the language as
descriptive of the type of proceedings at issue in Carey.
For example, in Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 6 plaintiffs, female
workers at a plastics plant, filed a Title VII class action alleging em-
ployment discrimination. The result was a settlement in plaintiffs'
favor, providing for an award of attorneys' fees, the amount of which
was left to the determination of the district court.161 The district court
subsequently awarded fees to the plaintiffs, but held that under Carey,
fees were not recoverable for the time the attorneys spent persuading
the federal government to debar the defendant from its federal con-
tracts (because of defendant's discriminatory practices). 62
The district court in Chrapliwy found that the attorneys' efforts of
persuasion were not "mandatory procedures."'' Specifically, the dis-
trict court interpreted the language of section 706(k), regarding attor-
ney fee awards "[i]n any action or proceeding under this
subchapter,"' as limiting awards to when "the attorney's time and
157. Crest, 479 U.S. at 14-15 (citing Webb v. County Bd. of Educ., 471 U.S. 234,241
n.15 (1985)).
158. Id. (quoting Webb, 471 U.S. at 241, n.15).
159. 447 U.S. 54 (1980).
160. 670 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 461 U.S. 956 (1983).
161. Id at 762. The settlement provided the class with $9,318,000.00, pension bene-
fits, reinstatement with seniority for 296 terminated class members, and attorneys'
fees which were to be determined by the district court. Id
162. Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 442 (N.D. Ind. 1981).
163. Id at 452.
164. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
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efforts [are] mandated by the Title VII statute, or by related and re-
quired procedures .... [T]he attorney's time must be within the Title
VII procedure."'1 65
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, explaining that the attor-
neys' efforts to persuade the government to debar the defendant led
directly to the settlement of the pending Title VII action. 166 These
efforts "contributed to the ultimate termination of the Title VII ac-
tion, and in that sense [were] within the Title VII action."' 67 The
court concluded that "[s]ection 706(k) should be interpreted as al-
lowing attorneys' fees to the prevailing plaintiffs for services which
contribute to the ultimate termination of the Title VII action. 68
The court, therefore, awarded the attorneys' fees and observed that
"[i]f Carey has any application to the particular question before us, it
is in indicating that [Title VII] should be liberally rather than restric-
tively interpreted with respect to fees for services not performed, in
the ordinary sense, in proceedings before the Title VII court."' 69
Moreover, the court noted that the Carey Court supported awarding
attorney's fees because the Congressional rationale behind the enact-
ment of section 706(k) was to make "it easier for a plaintiff of limited
means to bring a meritorious suit."' 70
Although Chrapliwy awarded attorneys' fees, its holding may be
limited to circumstances in which counsel rendered services after the
Title VII action was filed. The Northern District Court of California
in Moreno v. City and County of San Francisco'7' addressed the issue
of whether to award attorney's fees for services the attorney rendered
before the filing of a Title VII action. 72 In Moreno, an aggrieved em-
ployee first filed a complaint of discrimination with the San Francisco
Civil Service Commission (CSC) and then with the FEP agency.' 73
The FEP Agency suspended their proceedings pending the comple-
tion of the CSC proceedings. 7 When the CSC provided injunctive
and monetary relief, the Agency withdrew its charges against the de-
fendant employer. 75 The CSC award did not include of attorney's
fees, 76 therefore the complainant filed a Title VII action to recover
the fees incurred during the CSC proceedings.
165. 509 F. Supp. at 451.
166. Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F.2d 760, aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 766
(7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 956 (1983).
167. Id. at 767.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 766-67.
170. Id. at 767 (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 420
(1978) (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 12,724 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey))).
171. 567 F. Supp. 458 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 459.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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While the defendant argued that the CSC proceedings were "collat-
eral," and thus not requisite Title VII proceedings for which the court
could award attorney's fees, the Moreno court, relying on Carey, re-
jected this argument."7 It interpreted Carey as permitting attorney
fee awards for informal dispute resolution because it is "Congress' in-
tent that federal policies be vindicated in nonfederal forums. "178
Moreno focused on the language in Carey that Title VII provides "au-
thorization of a civil suit solely to obtain an award of attorney's fees
for legal work done in state or local proceedings. 179
Moreno relied on the reasoning in Carey that to deny fee awards on
the local level would create an "incentive to get into federal court."' 18"
It thus repudiated the proposition that the proceedings at issue must
be "required" in order to award attorney's fees. 8 The court ex-
plained that even though the EEOC would not have referred the com-
plaint to the CSC, because the FEP agency did just that, "[f]or
practical purposes, the CSC was thus incorporated into the Title VII
scheme."'1 Thus the court held that the underlying reasoning of Ca-
rey supported awards of attorney's fees.las
4. Lower Courts Disallowing Recovery of Attorney's Fees
After the Webb and Crest decisions, courts began to disfavor award-
ing attorney's fees for informal procedures. While courts still follow
Carey, they emphasize the language in Carey regarding the mandatory
nature of the proceedings. For example, in Manders v. Oklahoma ex
rel. Department of Mental Health,"s female state hospital workers
charged their supervisor with sexual harassment and brought actions
against their supervisor, their employer, and the state agency seeking
money damages under Title VII and section 198 3.1ss
In Manders, the district court8 6 and the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit"s dismissed the plaintiffs' sexual harassment claim and
denied plaintiffs' recovery of attorney's fees for services resulting in a
177. Ld. at 459-60.
178. Id. at 459.
179. Id. (quoting New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 66 (1980)).
180. Id. at 459-60 (quoting Carey, 447 U.S. at 66).
181. Id. at 460.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 459-60.
184. 875 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1989).
185. Id.
186. The Northern District of Oklahoma granted summary judgment in favor of the
supervisor in his individual capacity on plaintiffs' § 1983 claims; dismissed on 12(b)(6)
grounds employees' Title VII sexual harassment claim as to all defendants; and, dis-
missed on 12(b)(6) grounds recovery of attorney's fees for the employees. Id. at 264
(the district court case is unpublished).
187. 875 F.2d 263 (1989) (O'Connor, J., sitting by designation).
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favorable outcome in internal grievance procedures. 188 The Tenth
Circuit held that plaintiffs could not recover fees incurred in "optional
internal grievance procedures." 8 9
The Manders court distinguished the administrative proceedings in
Carey from the internal grievance procedures at issue by characteriz-
ing the former as mandatory and the latter as optional.190 The Carey
administrative proceedings were "required or mandated procedures"
and "an integral part of the Title VII scheme," while the Manders pro-
ceedings, provided as part of Oklahoma State law, 191 were
"optional."' 19
Manders stated that it followed Carey's reasoning and public policy
with respect to "encouraging employers to provide informal resolu-
tions to discrimination in the work environment."'" Plaintiffs could
have filed their charge with the appropriate FEP agency 94 instead of
engaging in internal grievance procedures "had they known that attor-
neys' fees would be unavailable for the services performed in connec-
tion with the optional proceedings."'9 5 The Manders court also stated
that requiring companies to pay for attorneys' fees, if the aggrieved
employee prevails, creates a disincentive for companies to implement
internal grievance procedures. 96
Most recently, in 1993 the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Duello v.
Board of Regents'9" held that Title VII does not provide for awards of
attorney's fees for "optional" internal grievance procedures. 98 In
Duello, the plaintiff, an assistant professor, claimed that the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin did not renew her employment contract due to sex
188. The internal grievance procedures did not lead to the supervisor's termination,
as requested by the aggrieved employees, but did result in the supervisor's demotion
and transferral (which was subsequently vacated after he filed a grievance of his own).
Id. at 266.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Okla. Stat. tit. 74, § 841.9 (1987 & Supp. 1989).
192. 875 F.2d at 266-67. Manders also contends that internal grievance procedures
are neither mandated nor required based on Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 72 (1986), which finds that liability may attach even if a complainant fails to
follow an employer's grievance procedure. 875 F.2d at 267. This argument fails to
acknowledge that there is a preliminary mandatory period during which the EEOC is
supposed to seek conciliation between the aggrieved employee and her employer, so
that informal dispute resolution is a practical requirement of Title VII. See infra notes
226-228 and accompanying text.
193. 875 F.2d at 267.
194. Here, the appropriate FEP agency was the Oklahoma Human Rights Commis-
sion. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. (permitting attorney fee awards "would tend to discourage private employ-
ers, as well as public employers like the defendants in this case, from instituting such
potentially ameliorative procedures").
197. 501 N.W.2d 38, 43 (Wis. 1993).
198. Id.
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discrimination. 199 She was represented by counsel in proceedings
before the University of Wisconsin-Madison's Committee on Faculty
Rights and Responsibilities (CFRR). These proceedings resulted in a
settlement in her favor.' The professor in Duello then sued in state
court under section 706(k) of Title VII to recover attorney's fees for
the CFRR proceedings.2"' The court held that because the CFRR
proceedings were "optional" under Title VII, the plaintiff was not en-
titled to recover attorney's fees. 202
The Duello court, relying on Carey, held that attorney's fees cannot
be shifted for internal grievance proceedings, such as the CFRR pro-
ceedings.2 3 The court interpreted Title VII's attorney fee-shifting
provision in accord with the language in Carey that "proceedings [are]
the state and local remedies to which complainants are required to
resort"'m and that complainant should not have to "bear the costs of
mandatory state and local proceedings."'' 5 In addition, the court ex-
amined analogous Supreme Court civil rights decisions' 6 in Crest and
Webb that awarded attorney's fees only for mandatory actions.' The
Duello court found that the CFRR proceedings "were an optional re-
view process which [plaintiff] was not required to invoke pursuant to
Title VII.' 2 °8
The plaintiff, however, also filed a claim with the EEOC, which re-
ferred her complaint to the state Personnel Commission. The Com-
mission placed plaintiff's complaint on "hold" pending the outcome of
the CFRR proceedings, 20 9 thus precluding the plaintiff from maintain-
ing a federal court action pursuant to Title VII until she completed the
199. 1& at 39.
200. Id. Prior to the CFRR proceedings, the professor filed a complaint with the
University's office of Affirmative Action and Compliance, which investigated the
complaint and concluded that she had been subjected to an "offensive and hostile
environment." Id. Despite this, the department declined to renew the professor's
contract. She filed a petition with the CFRR. Id. at 40. The settlement reached pro-
vided the professor with a full-time probationary faculty appointment as an assistant
professor. Id. at 41.
201. There is no explanation why the plaintiff filed this action in state court rather
than federal court. She did, however, reserve the right to sue to recover attorney's
fees. Id.
202. Id. at 39.
203. Id. at 42 (citing New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980)).
204. Id. at 43 (quoting Carey, 447 U.S. at 62) (emphasis in Duello).
205. Id. (quoting Carey, 447 U.S. at 63) (emphasis added).
206. North Carolina Dep't of Transp. v. Crest St. Community Council, Inc., 479
U.S. 6 (1986) (holding that only a court in an action to enforce civil rights laws may
award attorney's fees under § 1988); Webb v. County Bd. of Educ.. 471 U.S. 234
(1985) (denying recovery of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for attorney's fees
incurred during optional administrative proceedings).
207. Duello v. Board of Regents, 501 N.W.2d 38, 45-46 (WIS. 1993) (citing Crest,
479 U.S. at 11; Webb, 471 U.S. at 240).
208. Id. at 47.
209. Id. at 40.
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CFRR proceedings. °10 Thus, the court ignored that, in a practical
sense, the CFRR proceedings were mandatory for this plaintiff.
According to Duello, plaintiff's denial of recovery of attorney's fees
was a result of her attempt to resolve her dispute through the em-
ployer's internal review mechanism rather than immediately filing her
claim with a FEP agency.211 The court contended that its ruling would
not discourage an aggrieved employee from invoking the employer's
internal grievance procedures because of the probability that she
would not recover her attorney's fees." 2 Instead, the court argued
that an employee's attorney would not advise her client to forgo pro-
ceedings because of the absence of attorney's fees. 13 Finally, the Du-
ello court, like the Manders court, believed that it was "good public
policy" to deny attorney's fees for internal grievance procedures be-
cause otherwise employers would be less likely to implement such
procedures. 14
5. Analysis of Case Law
The Carey, Webb, Crest trilogy has influenced lower court decisions
to deny fee awards for informal dispute resolution. Consequently,
fees are only recoverable if the aggrieved employee reaches the level
of administrative proceedings. The denial of attorney fee awards frus-
trates the goals behind Title VII, which provides for a comprehensive
remedial scheme incorporating informal dispute resolution.2 1, 5 The re-
sult is that the aggrieved employee who vindicates her civil rights
through informal methods bears the cost of attorney's fees, while the
more litigious, though not necessarily more meritorious, employee re-
covers attorney's fees if she is the prevailing party. For women unable
210. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) requires an aggrieved employee to file a claim with the
EEOC and complete administrative proceedings before filing a court action. In addi-
tion, the EEOC must refer the charge to state or local FEP agencies, if they exist,
before the EEOC conducts its investigation. Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 1691.10(a).
The dissent in Duello contended that the CFRR review was not optional, but "was
indeed a proceeding under Title VII .... " 501 N.W.2d at 38 (Ceci, J., dissenting).
The lower court in Duello also maintained that fees could be awarded for internal
grievance proceedings. Duello v. University Bd. of Regents, 487 N.W.2d 56 (1992).
Oddly, the majority in Duello acknowledged that an FEP agency can hold its judg-
ment in abeyance by deferring to an alternate form of proceedings, which would
make the later proceedings "[f]or practical purposes, . . . incorporated into the Title
VII scheme." Duello, 501 N.W.2d at 44 (discussing Moreno v. San Francisco 567 F.
Supp. 458 (N.D. Cal. 1983)). The majority, however, was not persuaded by Moreno
and therefore did not find that the CFRR proceedings were required in order for a
fee award to be proper.
211. Id. at 45 (stating that "if claimants do not want to bear the costs of fees, they
can pursue their claims before a FEP agency").
212. Id. at 47.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 46 (citing Manders v. Oklahoma ex rel. Dep't of Mental Health, 875 F.2d
263, 267 (10th Cir. 1989)).
215. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
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to bear these costs, the denial of attorney's fees for informal dispute
resolution creates a barrier to resolving claims of sexual harassment in
a more private fashion.216
The case law since the Webb and Crest decisions fails to adequately
provide for the fair resolution of sexual harassment claims through
informal means for two primary reasons. First the pre-Crest and pre-
Webb cases, Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc.217 and Moreno v. City and
County of San Francisco,218 have more persuasive rationales for
awarding attorney's fees than cases holding to the contrary. Both
courts recognized that the legislative intent of Title VII and the
Supreme Court's interpretation of this intent in Carey indicate that
attorney's fees should be awarded for successful informal dispute res-
olution. In contrast, the reasoning in the post-Webb and post-Crest
cases, Manders v. Oklahoma ex reL Department of Mental Health21 9
and Duello v. Board of Regents,.-' undermines the purpose of section
706(k): to provide the meritorious employee with the means to en-
force her civil rights through various remedial measures, including in-
formal dispute resolution."
The second major deficiency of the recent case law is the focus on
mandatory proceedings. After Carey, Webb, and Crest, courts such as
Manders and Duello analyzed whether the proceedings are mandatory
or optional under Title VII, holding that attorney's fees are only avail-
able for mandatory proceedings.' - The focus on the mandatory
rather than the optional nature of the proceedings is misplaced. Con-
gress intended to promote equal access to vindicate civil rights when it
enacted section 706(k).3 The Court, therefore, should not take a su-
perficial reading of Title VII to deny attorney's fees for informal dis-
pute resolution because Congress failed to specify what type of
"proceeding" was within the ambit of section 706(k). Instead, courts
should focus on the purpose of section 706(k) and implement this pro-
vision to provide for the recovery of attorney's fees for informal dis-
pute resolution.' 4 Courts also should recognize that the exhaustion
requirement, which creates mandatory proceedings, expresses Con-
gress' preference for pre-litigation procedures, including informal dis-
pute resolution.2 -s
216. See discussion supra part I.B.
217. 670 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 461 U.S. 956 (1983).
218. 567 F. Supp. 458 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
219. 875 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1989).
220. 501 N.W.2d 38 (Wis. 1993).
221. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
222. Manders, 875 F.2d at 266; Duello, 501 N.W.2d at 42.
223. Marjorie A. Silver, Evening the Odds: The Case for Attorneys' Fee Awards for
Administrative Resolution of itle VI and Title VII Disputes, 67 N.C. L Rev. 379,397
(1989).
224. ld. at 399. Professor Silver, however, does not include internal grievance pro-
cedures as part of informal dispute resolution.
225. Id at 417.
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The distinction between mandatory and optional proceedings is also
a fallacy given "Title VII's requirements concerning submission of a
complaint to agency processes and the realities of EEOC practices
and procedures." '26 The plaintiff has a preliminary waiting period of
180 days after the charge is filed with the EEOC, or 240 days if the
charge is referred to an FEP agency, before she can file suit in federal
court.227 Under the mandatory/optional rationale employed by the
courts, this 180 or 240 day time period is clearly mandatory under Ti-
tle VII. Yet, under this rationale, it does not make sense to only
award fees for this initial period of conciliation, and not for the settle-
ment achieved through informal dispute resolution, which may take
longer than the preliminary period. The other illogical result of apply-
ing the mandatory/optional distinction is stopping the accrual of attor-
ney's fees after this initial period and recommencing the accrual of
fees when the aggrieved employee engages in mandatory administra-
tive proceedings or litigation.228 Limiting fee awards to a narrow in-
terpretation of "mandatory" proceedings does not recognize the
significance of informal dispute resolution. This reasoning ignores
both the integral role that preliminary conciliation plays22 9 and the
purpose of assisting impecunious civil rights victims to vindicate their
rights.230
The consequence of not awarding attorney's fees for informal dis-
pute resolution creates two mutually exclusive outcomes. First, this
denial of fees creates a perfunctory period of "conciliation," in which
the aggrieved employee forgoes as soon as possible (after the 180 or
240 day period) in order to file a protective lawsuit to recover attor-
ney's fees. Second, if the conciliation is meaningful and results in a
favorable result for the aggrieved party, it is a pyrrhic victory because
she must pay attorney's fees. Ideally, a third outcome is possible:
conciliation occurs within this short time period and perhaps the com-
plainant recovers attorney's fees."'
Some courts argue that when recovery of attorney's fees is avail-
able, there is no incentive to litigate a claim to a "mandatory" level
because competent counsel will not advise the client against pursuing
informal dispute resolution. 2  These courts, however, fail to ac-
226. Id. at 418.
227. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-f(5).
228. See Silver, supra note 223, at 418 (discussing the role of administrative
proceedings).
229. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
230. See discussion supra part III.A.
231. Research has not revealed any cases in which an aggrieved party recovered
attorney's fees for this preliminary period. Perhaps, court actions are not filed to
recover attorney's fees for this short period because the cost of these fees is not large
and the chance of recovering both the original fees incurred and the additional fees
for filing the suit to recover all of the fees is slim.
232. See Duello v. Board of Regents, 501 N.W.2d 38, 47 (Wis. 1993); cf. North Car-
olina Dep't of Transp. v. Crest St. Community Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6, 14-15 (1986)
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knowledge that while competent counsel will advise the client regard-
ing the best avenues of relief, including informal dispute resolution,
only the client knows what remedies she can afford. Once the client,
especially one of limited means, finds out that her success at the ad-
ministrative level comes with a price tag, she may not want to pursue
such a bittersweet victory.
The Supreme Court in Carey also recognized the importance of hir-
ing private counsel for administrative proceedings. 33 For informal
dispute resolution, the need for a private attorney is greater at this
preliminary stage of a Title VII claim because the law does not pro-
vide the complainant with counsel. The need increases in light of the
often crucial investigation and bargaining that occurs at this initial
level.3
Some courts also propose that permitting attorney fee awards for
internal grievance procedures inhibit a company from implementing
such procedures.3 5 This rationale, however, is unconvincing and gen-
erally obsolete given the current law of employer liability for sexual
harassment.3 6 Effective internal grievance procedures usually shield
companies from liability, which is one of the main reasons companies
implement these procedures.3 7 On the other hand, the employee
who participates in internal grievance procedures without an attorney
is less likely to prevail. 38 Yet, if an employee refuses to participate in
internal dispute resolution, she may prolong her harassment, as well
as subject herself to pressure by the EEOC to engage in concilia-
tion.3 9 Thus, the employer suffers no detriment by refusing to pay
attorney's fees at this level, while the employee does.
Under the current trend in the law to deny attorney's fees for infor-
mal dispute resolution, the options for the employee are not
favorable: pay for an attorney she cannot afford; forgo obtaining an
attorney and perhaps suffer an unfavorable resolution of the dispute;
be uncooperative and also likely suffer the negative consequences; or
seek administrative or other judicial relief although she would rather
(discussing competent counsel for section 1988 claims); Webb v. County Bd. of Educ.,
471 U.S. 234, 241 n.15 (1985) (same).
233. 447 U.S. 54, 70 (1980).
234. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
235. See Manders v. Oklahoma ex reL Dep't of Mental Health, 875 F.2d 263, 267
(10th Cir. 1989); Duello v. Board of Regents, 501 N.W.2d 38, 46 (Wis. 1993).
236. See discussion supra part I.A.
237. 1&
238. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
239. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(1) provides:
The Commission shall have power ... upon request of (i) any employer,
whose employees or some of them, or (ii) any labor organization, whose
members or some of them, refuse or threaten to refuse to cooperate in effec-
tuation the provisions of this title, to assist in such effectuation by concilia-
tion or such other remedial action as is provided by this title ....
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keep the charges more private. Courts should protect the interests of
women subject to sexual harassment, as Congress intended the courts
to do when it enacted Title VII and section 706(k), and make attor-
ney's fees available to the employee who vindicates her right to be
free from sexual harassment through informal dispute resolution.
IV. PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR AWARDING ATrORNEY'S FEES
To provide a meaningful avenue to uphold the employee's civil
rights, section 706(k) of Title VII should cover not only claims that are
litigated in administrative proceedings and court actions, but also
claims resolved through informal dispute resolution. As the Second
Circuit in Carey summed up, "the question is whether section 706(k)
encompasses fee awards to complaining parties who succeed at a step
in the statutory scheme before they are forced to litigate their claims
in federal court.""24 Because informal dispute resolution obviates the
need to litigate in administrative or judicial proceedings, fees should
be available. Moreover, courts should follow Moreno and award at-
torney's fees for proceedings that occurred before the filing of a Title
VII action, if such proceedings ultimately lead to the resolution of the
Title VII action in favor of the plaintiff.24' Fees also should be avail-
able for the complainant who avoids the need to engage in a court
action or an administrative proceeding because the employer has re-
dressed the discrimination through informal procedures.
Beyond allowing recovery for attorney's fees, a clearer framework
should be in place for addressing due process concerns because em-
ployers may not be on notice that they have to pay a complainant's
attorney's fees. Adequate notice can be based on filing with the
EEOC or the appropriate state or local FEP agency. By law, these
Title VII agencies must inform employers of the filed charges against
them within ten days.242 A complainant, however, should still be able
to recover attorney's fees for a "reasonable period of time prior to the
notification of representation," in accordance with the current EEOC
guidelines.243 In addition, adequate notice also can come directly
240. Carey v. New York Gaslight Club, Inc., 598 F.2d 1253, 1257 (2d Cir. 1979).
241. 567 F. Supp. 458 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
242. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b) provides that after a charge is filed, the EEOC must
"serve a notice of the charge (including the date, place and circumstances of the al-
leged unlawful employment practice)" within ten days.
243. C.F.R. 1613.271(d)(iv) provides:
Attorney's fees shall be paid only for services performed after the filing of
the complaint required ... and after the complainant has notified the agency
that he or she is represented by an attorney, except that fees are allowable
for a reasonable period of time prior to the notification of representation for
any services performed in reaching a determination to represent the
complainant.
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from the employee who informs the employer that she has retained an
attorney to assist her with remedying the sexual harassment.
Providing for attorney fee-shifting at the informal level will also
equalize the bargaining power of the aggrieved employee and the em-
ployer. While arguably the wise attorney and complainant will stipu-
late to attorney's fees, this is not a satisfactory response to the
unavailability of fees for informal dispute resolution. First, the em-
ployer has the upper hand in this situation because fee awards are
often rejected after the parties have reserved this issue for a future
time.2' Second, an employer can negotiate a settlement that incorpo-
rates a waiver of attorney's fees.24 Thus, there is no reason for an
employer to agree to pay the complainant's attorney's fees except out
of good faith, unless Congress amends Title VII or the Supreme Court
creates a bad faith exception to such waivers. 46
The lack of any reference in section 706(k) or its legislative history
to whether attorney fee-shifting should apply to administrative pro-
ceedings or informal dispute resolution indicates that Congress did
not foresee this problem. While the Supreme Court has discerned
Congress' intent to permit fee awards for services rendered during
state administrative remedies, it has not extended this to informal dis-
pute resolution, despite the statutory emphasis on these types of pro-
ceedings. Congress, therefore, must intervene and amend section
706(k) to specify that fee awards are permissible for a prevailing party
in formal dispute proceedings brought to enforce Title VII.
Textually, the proposed amendment to Title VII should provide
that:
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter [42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e] the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,
other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attor-
ney's fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs, and the Com-
mission and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a
private person.
A court may award such fees to a party who has prevailed in any
proceedings, brought to enforce a claim under this title, including
(but not limited to):
1. judicial proceedings;
2. federal, state, or local administrative proceedings; and
244. See, e.g., Webb v. County Bd. of Educ., 471 U.S. 234 (1985) (reserving issue of
recovery of attorney's fees, which were later denied); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 509
F. Supp. 442 (N.D. Ind. 1981) (reserving issue of recovery of attorney's fees to the
district court, which held such fees were not recoverable for the portion of the attor-
neys' work at the informal level), rev'd, 670 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 956 (1983).
245. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
246. See Margaret Annabel de Lisser, Note, Giving Substance to the Bad Faith Ex-
ceptions of Evans v. Jeff D_- A Reconciliation of Evans with the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fee Awards Act of 1976 (1987) (discussing Evan's bad faith exception which may pro-
hibit the defendant who regularly negotiates fee waivers).
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3. informal dispute resolution proceedings.
Costs can only be recovered for a prevailing party if the company
had adequate notice of the complaint's representation by counsel.
Such adequate notice results when the complainant files with the
Commission.
Fees are recoverable regardless of whether the complainant resorts
to an administrative proceeding or court action or whether a court
action is filed.247
This proposed amendment would provide clearer guidance for courts
and at the same time allow courts to use their discretion to determine
which proceedings enforce Title VII.
At a minimum, courts should acknowledge the goals underlying Ti-
tle VII-to provide equal access for aggrieved employees to vindicate
their rights to be free from employment discrimination-and interpret
Title VII to allow fee awards for informal dispute resolution. Courts
should recognize that in writing legislation, Congress cannot possibly
conceive of every facet and ramification of an enactment.248 In addi-
tion, the process of amending legislation is fraught with obstacles that
make it difficult for Congress to modify current legislation.249
Congress should rectify and courts should recognize the integral
role informal dispute resolution plays in Title VII by awarding attor-
ney's fees to prevailing complainants. To overlook the comprehensive
remedial scheme of Title VII and the policies that perpetuate it is to
hinder aggrieved employees, especially women, from bringing sexual
harassment claims and redressing the violation of their civil rights.
V. CONCLUSION
Informal dispute resolution offers women the opportunity to re-
solve their claims of sexual harassment in the most informal, private
manner. Elements that contribute to women's desire to keep sexual
harassment a private claim are the psychological and economic effects
of the harassment, as well as the legal ramifications of bringing a claim
of harassment.
Women and employers both have an interest in resolving com-
plaints of sexual harassment, but their interests are not always aligned.
Although both parties want the harassment to subside in an expe-
dited, private fashion, women may also want to preserve their causes
of action, while employers want to shield themselves from liability.
Because of these divergent interests and the role an attorney can play
in protecting women's right to be free from sexual harassment, fee-
shifting must be allowed in informal dispute resolution.
247. Emphasis is on the proposed changes to section 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(k).
248. See Silver, supra note 223, at 397 (reviewing the reasons for ambiguous statu-
tory enactments).
249. Id.
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The recent trend in the lower courts, however, is to deny recovery
of attorney's fees for informal dispute resolution. This denial of fees
undercuts the purpose of Title VII to redress the rights of victims of
sexual harassment through various remedial measures, including in-
formal dispute resolution. Congress, therefore, should amend Title
VII to incorporate attorney fee-shifting for informal dispute resolu-
tion in order to provide women with a more private, less adversarial
forum to redress violations of sexual harassment.

